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ABSTRACT
An analytic characterization of the process of executing a well-
defined decision-making task by a human decision maker is presented.
A basic two-stage model of this process is introduced in which exter-
nal situations are first assessed and then responses are selected.
An information theoretic framework is used in which total internal
activity is described in terms of internal coordination and internal
decision-making, as well as throughput and blockage. A constraint on
the rate of internal processing is suggested as a model of bounded
rationality. The model is extended to include basic interactions in
an organizational context: Direct control is modeled as a restriction
on internal decision-making by external commands while indirect control
is incorporated through an auxiliary situation assessment input received
from the organization.
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INTRODUCTION
The role of the human decision maker is central to the design and
evaluation of alternative organizational structures. Each structure
includes a number of interacting decision makers (DMs) who must make
compatible decisions in overlapping areas of responsibility using dif-
ferent data. If the decisions are based on organization-wide objectives,
then the determination of decision strategies is a team-decision theor-
etic problem. In previous work on such problems [1], [2], [3], it has
been assumed tacitly that the DMs are perfectly rational, i.e., each
DM is allowed a given set of alternatives, has some knowledge of the
consequences of choosing a particular alternative, and can rank order
the alternatives with respect to some index of performance [4]. Optimal
decision strategies are then obtained.
An alternative 'hypothesis, however, is that due to limitations in
information processing and problem solving ability, the decision maker
is unable to construct and consider all alternatives in a given situation,
and cannot evaluate precisely the alternatives that he does consider t5].
To the extent that this is the case, the rationality of the decision
maker cannot be perfect no matter how "intendedly rational" he is [6],
i.e., he exhibits bounded rationality. March and Simon suggest that
the DM with bounded rationality seeks to find an alternative which is
satisfactory with respect to a given criterion, i.e., an alternative
which satisfices t7].
Input-output models of the decision maker with bounded rationality
have already been presented 18], [9], [10]. The basic departure in this
paper from previous work is the modeling of the internal processing in
transforming the inputs to the decision maker into outputs. This charac-
terization of the decision-making processing is achieved through a
synthesis of qualitative notions of decision-making with the analytic
framework of information theory in which an internal decision strategy
determines the input-output mapping. The characterization is such that
(l). an analytic representation of the total activity required to
accomplish the internal processing can be given as a function
of the internal decision strategy;
(2) the bounded rationality of a decision maker appears naturally
as a constraint on the rate of total activity; and
(3) indirect and direct control through interactions with other
organization members is included readily.
March and Simon [7] have hypothesized that the decision-making
process of the satisficing decision maker is a two-stage process of "dis-
covery and selection." The first stage is that of determining the situa-
tion of the environment, while the second addresses the question of what
action to take in a particular situation. Selection in the first stage
takes the form of choosing the degree and type of the "discovery" which
the decision maker wishes to make regarding his environment, while dis-
covery in the second stage pertains to generating possible courses of
action for consideration. Clearly, the stages are coupled in that the
type of alternatives sought depend on the situation perceived. Together
they constitute the "construction of the decision situation" from which
a decision emerges, since if the decision-making process has been car-
ried out adequately, a satisfactory alternative is generated. Recent
work by Wise [11] has supported this viewpoint.
Wohl 112] has suggested a similar two-stage model of the decision
process through an extension of the classical stimulus-response model
in psychology. When a stimulus is received, the initial reaction of
the decision maker is to hypothesize about its origin. This is followed
by the generation and evaluation of options, among which one response is
selected. Wohl applies this Stimulus - Hypothesis - Option - Response
(SHOR) model in a military context to the tactical decision process.
The model of the DM developed in the following sections yields
pure internal decision strategies when the decision maker is unconstrained,
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and mixed strategies when bounded rationality is introduced. Similarly, in
the satisficing context, it is shown that it is possible for the solutions
to be only mixed strategies. Also, the greater the uncertainty in the in-
put or stimulus to the DM, the greater the total activity required in the
internal decision-making process. This is consistent with aspects of orga-
nization theory [13] that relate in a qualitative manner the uncertainty in
the task to be performed and the amount of information that must be proces-
sed within the organization during task execution in order to achieve a
given level of-performance.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the model of
the decision making process is developed. In the following sections, the
decision strategies for normative and satisficing problems are obtained and
analyzed. Finally, the effect of interactions with the rest of the organiza-
tion and the concepts of direct and indirect control are explored.
MODEL OF THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS
Based on the above discussion, the following two-stage model is assumed,
and is illustrated in Figure 1. The decision maker receives an input x from
his environment and uses it in the situation assessment (SA) stage of proces-
sing to "hypothesize about its origin." This results
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Fig. 1 The Basic Model of the Decision-Making Process
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in the selection of a particular value of z, the variable that denotes the
situation. Signals from the rest of the organization (RO) may modify the
assessment of the situation and lead to the determination of a value for
z. Possible alternatives of action are then evaluated in the response
selection (RS) stage. The outcome of this process is the selection of
action or decision response y. A command input v' from the rest of the
organization may affect the selection process.
Many classes of decisions can be represented by the process of Figure 1.
Consideration in this paper will be restricted to decision-making tasks
which are well-defined and which are performed in the steady-state, that is,
the decision maker is assigned a particular task for which he is well
trained and which he performs again and again for successively arriving
inputs.
The first step, SA, can be considered as containing a set of well
defined procedures or algorithms which map the input stimuli x to the
assessed situation z. The algorithms differ in the amount of resources
required to process the input and in the quality of the assessment they
produce. However, no connection between these two attributes is assumed.
The algorithms remain fixed as the process takes place; there is no
adaptation or learning within each algorithm.
To be more precise, assume that the state of the decision maker's
environment is given by x', an r-dimensional vector which takes values
from a finite alphabet. However, the decision maker receives as input x,
which is a noisy measurement of x'. The vector x is also r-dimensional
and takes known values from a finite alphabet according to p(x).
The decision maker selects one of the U algorithms he possesses that
map measurements x into assessed situations z, where z is an s-dimensional
vector taking M values, with s < r. In the extreme case, the situation
assessment would involve an estimation of the entire state x'. However,
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it is more likely that in order to choose an appropriate output or decision
response, i't is necessary to consider only some "sufficient statistic" deter-
mined from the measurement x. Thus, z represents a possible aggregation of
input data. The input-output mappings of the algorithms used to determine
z from x are denoted by fi(x) where i = 1, 2,..., U. For a given x, the
situation assessment is obtained by the realization of the variable u. This
variable is one of the internal choices in the decision-making process; in-
deed, according to the model defined above it represents the real decision
made in accomplishing the assessment task. This process can be represented
as shown in Figure 2, where q is the noise source in the measurement of
x', and x = x' +q. The internal choice has been represented as a switch
which takes positions according to the realization of u.
SA
Fig. 2 Situation Assessment Stage
The inputs to the decision maker are considered to be symbols generated
by a source according to p(x). A memoryless source is assumed, i.e., each
symbol is generated independently. The quantity
H(x) = - I P(X) log2 p(x) (1)
x
is defined to be the entropy of the source per symbol generated [141 measured
in bits. If, in addition, the source is such that an input symbol is gene-
rated every T seconds on the average, the entropy rate of the source is
given by H(x)/Twhich is measured in bits per second. The quantity T is
the mean symbol interarrival time and it is a description of the "tempo"
of operations. The quantity H(x) can also be interpreted as the uncer-
tainty regarding which value the random variable x will take.
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To effect a mapping from x to z each algorithm consists of a series
of steps, such as intermediate computations or comparisons. These steps
specify the variables of the algorithm. Suppose algorithm i contains a.
variables denoted by
Wi= {w 1 W (2)
I
and let the algorithms have no variables in common, i.e.,
Win Wj = 0 i / j; Vi,j& {1,2,...,U}. (3)
Then, the model of the situation assessment stage consists of a system of
variables, denoted SI , where
I i 2 U z}S = {U, W W ... W Z} (4)
The interconnection of these variables is determined by the algorithmic
interconnections within sets Wi , as well as the interconnection among al-
gorithms determined by the variable u.
A key assumption in the following sections is that the mappings f.
are deterministic. Furthermore, because of the model structure, each al-
gorithm is considered to be active or inactive, depending on the internal
decision u. The probability distribution for each internal variable w.
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therefore has two distinct modes.. Consider the variable w1 which is
active when u = 1. Under this condition it takes values according to the
values of the input x and also according to the characteristics of the
algorithm. If u f 1, then wl is inactive, and in that case is assumed
to take a fixed value which is not one of the values taken when active.
The deterministic property of the algorithm implies that once the input
is known and the algorithm choice is made, all other variables of the system
are known.
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Finally, because no learning takes place during the performance of a
sequence of taks, the successive values taken by the variables of the model
are uncorrelated,i.e., the model is memory-less. Hence, all information
theoretic expressions written in the following development are on a per
symbol basis (per symbol of the input); rates are determined by dividing
the appropriate quantities by the mean symbol interarrival time T.
G , the uncertainty in the system when the input is known, is by
n
definition
I H (U, Wr1 2 U
G H (u, W, ,... W , z) (5)
n x
where H ( ) is the conditional entropy (uncertainty) given by
H (z) = - C p(x) I p(zIx) log 2 P(Zlx)- (6)
x z
In the present case, it reduces to
G = H(u). (7)
The internal decision u is independent of the input x; x and u together
determine the system S. The fundamental quantity in H(u) is the distribution
p(u) which represents the inclination of the decision maker to select a par-
ticular algorithm, and is termed the internal decision strategy. For succes-
sively arriving inputs, the strategy reflects the relative frequency of a
particular algorithm's use.
If an algorithm is used exclusively (p(u = i) = 1 for some i) then
H(u) =0, which indicates that no real decision is being made. On the
other hand, when p(u) is uniform, i.e., each algorithm is equally likely
to be chosen, then H(u) is at a maximum. G is therefore interpreted to
n
be the amount of internal decision-making in the situation assessment
stage.
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The mutual information or transmission 114] between x and z written
T(x:z), describes the input-output relationship or throughput of the SA
stage, which is denoted by G . Throughput is evaluated, by the definition,
from
T(x:z) = H(z) - H (z). (8) 
x
Recall that the fundamental quantity in H(z) is p(z); similarly,
p(zlx) and p(x) are needed to evaluate H (z). A straightforward application
of Bayes' rule,coupled with the knowledge of distribution pCx) and the
algorithm mappings fi(x),is sufficient to demonstrate that GI is determined
as an explicit function of the internal decision strategy p(u).
A quantity complementary to the throughput is that part of the input
information which was not transmitted by the system, i.e., the blockage
of the system. It is denoted G and given by
b
I I
G = H(x) - Gt (9)
The total coordination in the situation assessment (SA) stage is given by
I 11 1 2 U
G = T(w:w2:...:w :w:...:w :u:z) (10)
where T denotes the mutual information between all the variables. If the
system S consists of U interconnected subsystems as shown in Figure 2,
then the total coordination can be decomposed in terms of the internal
coordination of each subsystem plus the coordination among subsystems
[15], [16]; in this case the decomposition is given by
I ~i
Gc = [ pigc (p(x))+ a. H(Pi)] + H(z) (11)
c=l
where gc denotes the internal coordination present in the i-th algorithm,
Pi is the probability that the i-th algorithm has been selected, i.e.,
Pi = p(u = i), and H(p) is the entropy of a random variable that can
take one of two values with probability p [17]:
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H(p) = p log p + (l-p) log 1-p). (2)
The function is shown in Figure 3. The expression for the total
I
coordination, eq. (11), reflects the presence of switching within S
The weighting of the subsystem coordinations gc is the relative frequency
of each algorithm's use (the internal decision strategy). The value of
i
each g depends on the internal variables of the algorithm and its
implementation and on the characteristics of the input.
C.
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Fig. 3 Coordination Per Variable Required for Initialization
The second term of eq. (11) is interpreted to be the coordination
required to switch among algorithms; it can also be regarded as the effort
or resource use required to initialize the variables of an algorithm prior
to its use. Examination of the mathematical expression for this coordina-
tion shows that it is dependent on Pi, the relative frequency of a parti-
cular algorithm's use, and furthermore, that each variable of the same
algorithm makes an equal contribution to the total. The latter is not
unreasonable, and the former is necessary because the coordination equation
represents steady-state phenomena, i.e., the coordination required to initia-
lize algorithms is very much related to the number of times on the average
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such initializations must take place. Reference to Figure 3 shows that the
nature of this relationship is such that if a particular algorithm is al-
ways used (p = 1 in Figure 3), the initialization coordination is zero,
as no initializations are taking place in the steady state. Similarly,
if an algorithm is never used, it is never initialized ( H(O) = 0). In
addition the symmetry of H(p) about p = 0.5 is significant because frequent
use of an algorithm requires on the average the same number of initiali-
zations as equally infrequent use. This phenomenon arises because an of-
ten used algorithm is likely to be used for successive inputs, in which
case no re-initialization would take place. Furthermore, since GI mea-
c
sures the global coordination among all variables of S , and since z is
the only variable within SI which is related to all other variables, it
is to be expected that GI contains the term H(z).
c
Finally, the total uncertainty is defined as
GI = IH (w) + H(u) + H(z); (13)
weS
it is the sum of the entropy of each variable in S . The Partition Law of
Information 1151 yields the following identity:
G =G +G + + G (14)
n t b c
Fq. (14) states that coordination, throughput, blockage, and internal decision
making together describe the total activity in a system.
The four quantities on the right hand side of eq.(14) can be computed,
if the probability distributions p(x) and p(u) are known and if the algorithms
f. and their specific realizations are given. A computer program that carries
out the extensive calculations has been written.
The full realization of the basic model of Figure 1 is shown in Figure 4.
The situation assessment stage is as described in the previous paragraphs. The
variable z', the supplementary situation assessment received from the rest of
10
the organization, combines with some subset of the elements of z to produce
z. The variables z and z are of the same dimension and take values from the
same alphabet. The processing of z and z is accomplished by the subsystem
SA which contains the deterministic algorithm A; the latter defines a set
of CA variables, including z, labelled WA.
Z Iv
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Fig. 4 Realization of the Basic .Model
If there were no command input v', then p(vjz) specifies the internal
decision for selecting one of the V algorithms that map z into the output
y, i.e.,
y = h.(z). (15)
The development of the analytical description of the response selection
stage (RS) is identical to that for the situation assessment but with p(vlz)
in place of p(u). Each algorithm h. contains a' interconnected variables,
u+j
denoted W , which specify the input-output mapping (15). The RS algorithm
variables, together with the internal decision variable v and the output
variable y, constitute the set of all variables of subsystem SI I .
The existence of a command input v' from the rest of the organization
-modifies the decision maker's choice v. A final choice v is obtained from
an algorithm b
b: v = b(v,v') v = 1, 2,...,V. (16)
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The specification of b(v,v') defines a protocol according to which the
command is used, i.e., the values of v determined by b(v,v') reflect the
degree of option restriction effected by the command.
The overall process of mapping the assessed situation z and the command
input v' into the final choice v is represented by algorithm B in Figure 4,
and the result of this process is a determinsitic modification of the strategy
p('vlz) into an effective strategy p(vlzv'). The processing of z and v' to
yield v is done in subsystem SB which contains the algorithm B; the latter has
a variables.
B
If the model of the decision-making process, Figure 4, is viewed as
a system S consisting of subsystems S , S S , and S which inputs x,
z', and v' and output y, then the Partition Law for information can be
expressed as follows:
* Throughput
Gt = T(x,z',v' : y) (17)
* Blockage
Gb = H(x,z',v') - Gt (18)
* Internal Decision-Making
G = H(u) + H_ (v) (19)
n z
* Coordination
I A B II I A B II
=GI + + GB + GII T (SI: S :S S) (20)
c c c c c
where
G = g (P(z)) (21)
c c
B B
G = gc(p(z)) (22)
c c12
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GcII= I pjgc (p(zV=j)) + aj H(pj)J + H(y) (23)
I A B II 
T(S :S :S :S ) H(z) + H(Z) + H(v,z) + T (x':z') + T (x',z':v'). (24)
z z
She expression for the internal decision-making, eq. (19), shows that
G depends on the two internal decision strategies p(u) and p(viz), even
though a command input v' may exist. This implies that the command in-
put modifies his internal decision after p(v[z) has been determined.
Furthermore, it is possible for the command input to override totally
the internal decision, i.e.,
v = b(v,v') = v'.
The analysis and interpretation of the effects of z' and v' on the
organization require further consideration of the types of interaction
that can occur. These depend on the information structure of the organi-
zation. A general representation of the interaction between one DM and
the rest of the organization is shown in Figure 5. The overall input
to the organization from its environment is a vector X'. In this case,
the information structure is defined by the two partioning matrices
1 and ff2 with
x' = I x' , x' = 22x ' (25)
where x' is the input vector to the DM and x' is the input vector to the
0
rest of the organization (RO). In general, x' and x' can be disjoint,
0
overlapping partially, or even identical. The only assumption that needs to
XlXo Io X0 YRO
x q DYDM
ll ,
Fig. 5 Information Structure for Organization Member
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be made at this time is that z', derived from x' , provides additional
o
information to the DM. The assumption is necessary for deriving the
detailed computable expressions for the throughput Gt . The expression
for blockage reflects the fact that
Gt + Gb H(x,z',v')
i.e., all the uncertainty in the inputs to the DM either appears in the
output (via the throughput) or is blocked internally.
The coordination for the system S, eq. (20), contains the internal
coordination within each subsystem plus the coordination due to the inter-
action between subsystems. The first term in eq.(20) is identical to that
of eq. (4) for the situation assessment stage. The second term, eq. (21),
and the third term, eq. (22), depend on the probability distributions of
the internal assessment z and the modified assessment z, respectively.
The internal coordination in the response selection stage, eq. (23),
depends not only on the frequency with which each algorithm is selected,
pj, but also on the value of the assessed situation z and the value of
the command input. The fourth term, eq. (24), includes the coordination
I A A B A B II
due to the linkages betwen S and SA , S and S , and (S S ) to S
respectively. The term T (x':z'l arises because of the relationship
z
between the external input to the DM, x', and the supplementary situation
assessment input, z'. Because of this relationship, it is possible to
effect a greater coordination between SI and SA than that given by H(z),
i.e., more information about the input x' can be forwarded to SA than
contained in z. For example, it is possible that the RO can resolve
more finely a portion of the DM's input x' and a partial situation as-
sessment which is more refined in some aspects than the DM's own assess-
ment can therefore be made. In such an instance, an additional amount
of the input is passed forward to SA and the coordination between sub-
systems increases. This additional activity within the DM does not increase
the total in general; rather, it can, at times, reduce significantly the
activity required for subsequent processing, as will be illustrated later,
A similar interpretation applies to the term T (x',z':v').
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BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The notion of bounded rationality refers to the limited ability of the
human to process information. This qualitative notion translates readily
into a restriction on the rate of total activity. Since steady state
operation has been assumed, the rate of total activity can be expressed
in terms of the tempo of operations (or mean symbol interarrival time)
T by
G/T < F (27)
where F is the constraint expressing bounded rationality in bits per second.
It will be assumed further that the task assigned to a decision maker and
the choice of strategies must be such that constraint (27) is not violated.
In order to analyze the types of decision strategies used by a DM with
bounded rationality, it is useful to introduce a mechanism for evaluating
performance that is appropriate in both the normative and the descriptive
context [5].
Let y' be the desired decision response to the input x' and let L(x')
be a function or a table that associates a y' with each member of the input
alphabet x'.
The actual response y and the desired one, y', are compared using
a function d(y,y') which assigns a cost to each possible pair (y,y'). The
expected value of this cost can be obtained by averaging over all possible
inputs. This value can then serve as a performance index J for each pair
of internal strategies p(u) and p(vjz) . For example, if
d(yy') = 1 yY (28)
then
J(p(u), p(vlz)) = E{d(y,y')} = p(y/y') (29)
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which represents the probability of error in decision-making (Figure 6).
. I I
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Fig. 6 Model of Decision-Making Process With Performance
Evaluation Mechanism
The information obtained from performance evaluation can be used by
the organization designer in defining and allocating tasks to the decision
maker and in changing the number and contents of the situation assessment and
response selection algorithms. This is achieved through training and learning;
these processes, however, are outside the scope of this model, which is limited
to decision-making in the steady-state.
The following problems can be posed;
Given the model of the decision-making process shown in Figure 6,
where the internal processes are described by eqs. (14, (17)-(2Q),
determine the internal strategies p(u) and p(vlz) such that either
(a) J(p(u), p(v Iz)) is minimized;
or (bl J is minimized subject to G(p(u), p(vz))< F T
or (c) J< J
or (d) J< J subject to G< FT.
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-The first two are normative problems while the latter two are formulated
so as to obtain satisficing strategies with respect to a performance threshold J.
The bounded rationality condition depends on T; therefore, the internal stra-
tegies will also depend on the tempo of operations. The unconstrained cases
(a) and (c) can be throught of as limiting cases when T4- .
Decision strategies, i.e., situation assessment strategies p(u) and
response selection strategies p(viz), can be described as pure or mixed.
A pure strategy is one for which an algorithm fi is selected with probabi-
lity one, i.e.,
p(u = i') = 1 for some i'
and
p(v =j'lz = z for some j' and for each z .
Since there are U pure situation assessment strategies and V-M res-
ponse selection strategies, there are U'V-M possible pure decision strate-
gies. All other strategies are said to be mixed and are represented by
non-trivial distributions p(u) and p(viz). Every possible mixed strategy
can be expressed as a convex combination of pure strategies.
A useful way of describing the properties of the solutions to the four
problems (a)-(d) is by introducing the plane (J,G); each specific decision
strategy is represented by a point, a pair (J,G), in that plane. Indeed, if
a pure strategy is given, then, using eqs. (17)- (20) the components of G can
be evaluated and, from eq. (14), G itself. Similarly, given the same decision
strategy, the input-output pairs (xty) can be determined and, consequently,
J can be evaluated.
First, the convexity of G in the decision strategy is shown, The total
activity G is defined as the sum of the marginal uncertainties H(w) of each
system variable w .I5]. If the possible distributions p(w) are elements of
a convex distribution space, then H(w) is a convex function of p(w) [17]. Now,
corresponding to each pure strategy Dk is a distribution pk'(W) on w.'Furthermore,
any convex combination of pure strategies which defines-adecision strategy
determines a distribution p(w) of the arbitrary system variable w as a convex
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combination of the distributions of the same variable which correspond to
the pure strategies, i.e., if
p(w) = (- 6 ) (W) +6P2 (w)
then
H(w) > (1-6)H1 (w)+ 6H2 (w) o < 6 < 1
and
i H(w) > (1-6) I H (w)+ H2(w) o < 6 < 
w w w
The last expression is equivalent to
G >(1-6)G 1 + 6G2. (30)
Consider the mixed strategy
D(6) = (1-6)D1 + 6D2 . (31)
Then the objective function is given by
J(D) =(1-6)J1 + 6J2. (32)
Equations (30) and (32) are parametric in 6 and can be used to describe
the relationship of G and J as shown in Figure 7. The relative position of
pairs (Jl,G1 ) and (J2,G2) is arbitrary, i.e., it is not true in general that
a smaller total activity G also realizes worse performance J.
G
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Application of the above construction to all possible binary variations
between pure strategies and then to successive binary combinations of mixed
strategies leads to a region in the (J,G) plane that contains all possible
strategies. Such a region for three pure strategies* is shown in Figure 8.
Pure strategies Dk
Gi
D2
I I I
J 1 J 2 J3 J
Fig. 8 Region of admissible (J,G) Pairs
The lower boundary of the region consists of the pure strategies and
binary variations between pure strategies. It follows that the minimum J
solution,D,is a pure strategy as is the minimum G one, D3. The solution to
the problems (a)-(c) can be analyzed using the (J,G) representation.
(a) The minimum error strategy will always be a pure strategy.
This is evident from the construction of the (J,G) region.
(b) The bounded rationality condition is represented by a straight
line parallel to the J axis. For a fixed value of the rate F,
the bounded rationality threshold Gr is proportional to the
tempo of operations, i.e.,
G =FT
r
*The (J,G) region shown represents the solution space for a specific numerical
example [18J in which there are no inputs from the rest of the organization.
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The decision strategy that minimizes the error can be pure or mixed,
the latter a convex combination of two pure strategies. The specific solu-
tion depends on the intersection of the boundary of the (J,G) region with
the G line.
r
G
i Gr Fr2
I V
J1 Jo J
Fig. 9 Description of Solutions for Normative Problems (a), (b)
Two types of intersection are possible, as shown in Figure 9. For T= 1
the minimum error is achieved by the (pure) strategy corresponding to the
point (J ,G1l,'which is also the solution obtained to problem (a). However,
as T decreases, it may no longer be possible to use the optimal strategy,
as illustrated in Figure 9 for T =T 2 . In that case, the minimum error stra-
tegy is in general a mixed strategy, a binary variation between pure strategies.
As T decreases, i.e., the tempo of operations increases, there exists
in general some value T = below which the solution set is empty. This
means that the rate of input arrivals is too fast for adequate processing.
Such a condition represents on overload of the decision maker. Overload is
represented by a line G = Go that is below the solution region in the (J,G)
plane.
The solutions to the descriptive problems (c) and (d) can be characterized
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as the set of feasible solutions Pk to
U.V.M
Pkk _ (33)
k=l
U.V.M
= Pk 1 Pk > ° v k (34)
k=1
The condition (33) specifies a partition of the solution region by
the vertical line J = J as shown in Figure 10.
Gr
/
G /
G' "0;~~~~G- Fri/
Gj__ /G=
l . , Gr= F-1
J1J J
Fig. 10 Solutions to Descriptive Problems
Note that while, in general, an infinite number of decision strategies
(shaded region) are satisficing, the difference in total activity between
them can be quite large. Also, if the performance threshold J is less than
the minimum Jk then no satisficing solution exists.
The solution to the descriptive problem with a bounded rationality
constraint, (d)., is obtained readily as the set of strategies, represented
by values of Pk' which yield (J,G) pairs in the region defined by
R = (J,G) IG< r) Cl { (J,G) I J < J }(35)
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Several types of intersection are possible depending on the values of
Tand J. ForT sufficiently large, the set of satisficing strategies includes
the minimum error strategy (T =T 1 in Figure 10). As T decreases, however,
the solution set may contain only mixed strategies (T = T2), i.e., strategies
for which the amount of internal decision making G is non-zero. If T is de-
creased sufficiently CT =T3) then the satisficing solution set is empty. The
decision task can be accomplished but the performance will not be good enough,
i.e., the constraint J< J will be violated. Finally, there exist values of T
( < T ) for which the task cannot be accomplished.
-- o
The analysis using the (J,G) plane has shown that the minimum probabi-
lity of error is realized by a pure strategy when no constraints are present.
When the bounded rationality constraint is introduced, then it is possible
for the optimal strategy to be a mixed one. In the satisficing context,
it is also possible that, when the constraint of bounded rationality is
imposed, all satisficing strategies be mixed ones.
Another confirmation of earlier results that used an information
theoretic model of the decision maker 18], 19], [19] is that if the ob-
jective is to minimize the information processing activity G then pure
strategies result. Indeed, the minimum G points in Figure 9 always cor-
respond to pure strategies.
INTERACTIONS WITH THE ORGANIZATION
Before proceeding with the analysis of the DM's interactions with the
rest of the organization through the supplementary situation assessment z'
and the. control input v', the magnitudes of the terms in the partition law,
eq. (14), will be discussed.
First of all, the throughput and the blockage together are equal to
the entropy of the inputs, eq. (26). The maximum value this entropy can
take is
Gt + Gb = H(x,z',v') < log2 N + log2 M + log2V (36)
where N and M are the number of elements in the alphabets of x and z', res-
pectively, and V is the number of response selection algorithms.
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The internal decision-making G , eq. (19) ranges from zero to a
maximum value
O< G n< log2U + log2 V (37)
where U is the number of different situation assessment algorithms.
The coordination G , eq. (20), has five terms. The first four, eqs. (11),
(21) - C24), include the internal coordination terms for each subsystem
I A B II
S ,S ,S , and S (namely, the g 's) and terms proportional to the number
of variables each algorithm contains. The fifth term, eq. (24), as well
as the remaining terms in eqs. 11, (21)-(23) are of the order of
log2 N,log2 M, log 2U,log 2V or log2Y, where the Y is the number of elements
in the alphabet of y. An upper bound for G is:
Gc < (log2N+2) + 2 Alog2M + 2a Blog2V + a 1 (log2 M+2)
+ 21og 2N + 6log2M + log2V (38)
Since the number of variables in the algorithms is in general orders
of magnitude larger than the algorithm of N,M,U,V, or Y, the internal coor-
dination terms for the agorithms in the susbsytems dominate.
To illustrate the relative magnitudes or the various terms results
from a simple example [18] are shown in Table 1. It is the same example
from which Figure 8, 9, and 10 were extracted.
Note in Table 1 that the throughput and blockage add to 8.9 bits,
the entropy of the input x:
Gt + Gb = H(x) = log 2 486 = 8.9 bits
Since only pure strategies are listed, it follows that G is identically
zero. The internal coordination terms G clearly dominate.
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Table 1. ILLUSTRATION OF THE PARTITION LAW
STRATEGY t G Gc G J
D1 1.4 7.5 0 114.5 125.0 0.23
D2 1.2 7.7 0 109.9 118.8 0.25
D3 0.3 8.6 0 102.5 111.4 0.38
The introduction of the interactions with the rest of the organization
has a direct effect on the components of the partition law. While on the
one hand, the subsystems SA and SB contribute to the coordination term, the
information conveyed by z' and v' may reduce substantially the uncertainty
and thus reduce the value of G.
Consider again Figure 5. The overall task of the organization is part-
itioned by the organization designer into subtasks by specifying the infor-
mation structure 1191, t201. This, in turn, determines to a large extent
the types of interactions possible between organization members. As dis-
cussed earlier; the relationship between z and z'depends on the relation-
ship between x' and x' . The information structure will be assumed known
in the following discussion.
Because the decision making model has been formulated as a process,
it is possible to distinguish interactions occuring at different points
in the. process. Both interactions shown in Figure 4 are of the result
sharing form of cooperating behavior [21]. The situation input z' represents
the. result of input processing in RO and which is passed to the DM. Si-
milarly, the command input v' can be regarded as the result of another
decision process which occurs within the RO.
In the context of organization theory, the functional characteristics
of subsystems S and S that define the specific form of the interactions
can be chosen so that lateral relationships (S A ) as well hierarchical ones
(S ) can be represented 113]., For example, the function B(v,v') may be such
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that the command input serves to coordinate the response selection activi-
ties of two DMs of the same rank (same echelon) or it can be that the com-
mand input may be a direct command from a superior.
Still another view of the interactions among DMs is through the concepts
of influence and authority [6]. Influence is present when a DM's exercise of
discretion is limited externally. Discretion is interpreted in this model
as internal decision-making: p(u) and p(v iz). Simon writes [6] that the
basic method for such limitation is the alteration of the premises on which
the DM bases his decisions and the ability to do this is termed control.
Both indirect and direct control are evident in the model. The former is
possible through the suplementary situation input z' which can influence
or modify the final value z of the assessed situation and, therefore, alter
the premises upon which the response selection algorithm is chosen. Direct
control corresponds to the direct modification, through v', of the decision
strategy p(v lz).
To see more clearly the manner in which the interactions with the rest
of the organization affect the performance of a decision maker, two special
cases will be considered.
Indirect Control
Let the only input to the DM from the rest of the organization be z'
in this case v = v. Then the partition law expressions take the form;
G = H (u) + H-(v) (39)
n z
SI
Gt = T(x,z':y)
(40)
SI
Gb = H(x,z')-G
SI i A i
G [Pigc + i H (Pi) ] + H(z) + gc (p(z))
c 
i=l
+ I [ppj g (p(zv=j)) + a H(Pj)] + H(y)
j=-l 
+ H(z) + H(z) + T-(xtz') (41)
z
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One of the benefits of the situation input for the decision maker is
that an improved and refined assessment of the situation is made, which- con-
tributes to better performance, all other things being equal,i.e,, it does
not produce sufficiently higher activity that a change in strategy is neces-
sary to remain within rationality bounds. The ability of RO to alter per-
formance through z' represents an indirect control on the decision maker,
Such an influence need not be beneficial. If it is possible for RO to
select z' based on x' such that performance is improved, it is also equal-
ly possible to construct a z',x' relationship which causes lower performance.
In each case, once the strategy p(vlz) has been selected, the DM is subject
to control from the organization through z'.
While the control over performance that is possible by z' is easily seen,
it is also true, though perhaps less clear, that the situation input can cause
a significant change in either direction of the total activity G. Consider
the following example, which is based on the model given in Figure 11 where
z is assumed to take values z1 and z2 with equal probability.
1_ 2_ -
X f 1(x) Z h
Fig. 11 Deterministic Switching
The coordination activity present in this model is then given by
G = g + H(z) + (aO+cOa) H(O.5) + H(y). (42)
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The internal coordination of algorithms hi and h2 are zero because their
respective inputs are deterministic from the point of view of the algorithm, i.e.,
p(zv=l) = 1
0 z = z2
(43)
0 z = z
P(zlv=2) =1 1
1 z = z2
Now consider the same model, but with a situation assessment subsystem,
as shown in Figure 12.
Note that z still takes values z1, z2 with equal probability and that
a correspondence zi- zi, i = 1,2, is assumed. Suppose the relationship be-
tween x' and z' is such that z' is chosen so that
A(z,z') = z (44)
is always the case. It is an extreme case, but possible within the frame-
work of the model, and gives the result that algorithm h1 (zl) is always
used. It is easy to show that the difference in coordination activity be-
tween the models of Figures 11 and 12 is given by
SI 2 A SI2
G - G2 [gA(p (z)) + T (x':z)] - [(a'+a) H(0.5) + H (y)] (45)
c c c z12
SA RS
Fig. 12 Deterministic Switching With Situation Assessment
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where the superscript 2 denotes the basic two-stage model. The first
bracketed term in eq, (45)} represents the extra coordination introduced
into the model by the addition of the subsystem SA . If the number of
variables aO and a' in the response selection algorithms is large, the
coordination required in switching algorithms in the model of Figure 11
may exceed the amount introduced by SA . In that case, eq. (45) gives a
negative result and the activity in the model of Figure 12 is less than that
of the model of Figure 11 even though an additional stage of processing
is present. This illustrates the significant effect that the situation
input can have on the total activity of the model.
Direct Control
The possibility of direct control is present in the model through the
command input v'. Consider the case where organization interactions are
restricted to command inputs only. The expressions which characterize
this model are obtained by appropriate reduction of eqs. (14), (17)-(20):
CI
G = H(u) + H-(v) (46)
n z
GC = T(x,v':y) (47)
GbI = H(x,v')-G t (48)
U i B
GCI = [Pigc +i H(Pi)] + H(z) + g (p(z))
c i=l
+ I [jgc J(p(ziv=j)) +a! H(pj)] + H(y)
j=l
+ H(z) + H(z,v) + T (x':v') (-49)
where CI denotes command input only.
The extreme case of direct control occurs when the values of v' se-
lected as commands are such that the algorithm chosen is a determinsitic
function of v'. Note that this implies that a protocol function b(v,v')
is possessed by the decision maker which accomplishes the proper mapping.
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The effective amount of decision-making in this case then becomes simply
H(-u. Since the value of v is completely determined externally, an exter-
nally controlled switching is present, and considerable influence on the
activity in the response selection stage is exerted. It is equally apparent
that the performance will also be affected by v', and hence controlled
directly, either beneficially or adversely.
CONCLUSION
Qualitative notions of decision-making have been combined with con-
cepts from n-dimensional information theory into a working model which re-
presents the decision-making process of a well-trained commander in the
performance of a well-defined decision-making task. In particular, a
basic model has been developed in the form of a two-stage process in which
the situation is first assessed and then a response is selected based on
the assessed situation. The model reflects explicitly internal choices
made in the decision-making process. The stochastic version of the Parti-
tion Law of Information (PLI) has been used to characterize analytically
the model as a function of the internal decision strategy.
The bounded rationality of the decision maker has been expressed in
the form of a total activity rate constraint. It has been shown that the
decision strategies which realize the optimal performance (normative) or
satisficing performance (descriptive), subject to the boundedness of the
decision maker, may only be mixed strategies, i.e., the decision maker
alternates among options. It was also shown that alternating among options
requires additional activity in the form of re-initialization of algorithm
variables particular to each option. This activity and the coordination
activity required to execute each option once it is chosen constitute a
significant part of the total activity in the decision-making process. As
such, they present a key consideration in the characterization of the
decision maker with bounded rationality.
The extension of the basic model to include possible interactions
in an organizational context was considered. In particular, two types
of interaction, situation inputs and command inputs, are integral parts
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of the model. The notion of indirect control was shown to correspond to
the former, while direct control was evident in the latter. It was seen
that in terms of the model such control can be exercised to affect both
the performance J and total activity G of the decision maker either bene-
ficially or adversely.
The relative influence of each type of control is dependent on which.
stages dominate the overall performance and activity of the decision
maker. For example, if the situation assessment stage accounts for a
large fraction of the total activity and also dominates the overall per-
formance, then it is possible that a partial assessment determined exter-
nally would reduce the total activity without compromising performance
greatly. In such an instance the performance of a decision maker with
bounded rationality would be more robust against increases in the tempo
of operations. Similarly, variation in v' would have little impact on
the total process, if the first stage were dominant. Therefore, there is
a possibility that styles of command 112] may be explored through this model,
30
REFERENCES
[1] Y. C. Ho, "Team Decision Theory and Information Structures," Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 68, pp. 664 - 654, June 1980.
[2] Y. C. Ho and K. C. Chu, "Team Decision Theory and Information Struc-
tures in Optimal Control Problems, Part I," IEEE Transactions on
Automatic Control, Vol. AC-17, pp. 15-22, February 1972.
[3] Y. C. Ho and K. C. Chu, "Team Decision Theory and Information Struc-
tures in Optimal Control Problems, Part II,' IEEE Transactions on
Automatic Control, Vol. AC-17, pp. 22-28, Ferbuary 1972.
[4] Simon, H. A. , "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 69, pp. 99-118, February 1955.
15] J. G. March, "Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering
of Choice," The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 9, pp. 587-608,
Autumn 1978.
16] H. A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, MacMillan Co., New York,
1961.
[7] J. G. March and H. A. Simon, Organizationsf John Wiley and Sons,
New York., 1958.
[8] R. F. Drenick, 'Organization and Control," in Directions in Large
Scale Systems, Ho and Mitter, Eds., Plenum, New York, 1976.
[9] J. Froyd and F. N. Bailey, "Performance of Capacity Constrained
Decision Makers," Proceedings of the 19th IEEE Conference on Decision
and Control," Albuquerque, NM, December 1980.
[101 N. M. Papadopoulos, "The Garbling Decision Maker; A Model of Bounded
Rationality," IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, Vol. AC-25,
pp. 577-579, June. 1980.
11l] J. A. Wise, "Cognitive Bases for an Expanded Decision Theory," Pro-
ceedings of the 1979 IEEE International Conference on Cybernetics
and Society, Denver, CO, October 1979.
112] J. G. Wohl, "Battle Management Decisions in Air Force Tactical Command
and Control," Report M79-233, MITRE, Bedford, Mass., December 1979.
[13] J. R. Galbraith, Organization Design, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA,
1977.
[14] C. E. Shannon and W. Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication,
University of Illinois, Urbana, 1949.
[15] R. C. Conant, "Laws of Information Which Govern Systems," IEEE Trans-
actions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Vol. SMC-6, pp. 240-255,
April, 1976.
31
[16] W. R. Ashby, "Measuring the Internal Information Exchange in a System,"
Cybernetica, Vol. 8, pp. 5-22, 1965.
[17] G. D. Forney, "Information Theory," Electrical Engineering Dept.,
Stanford University, 1972.
[18] K. L. Boettcher, "An Information Theoretic Model of the Decision Maker,"
Laboratory forInformation and Decision Systems, Rep. LIDS-TH-1096, MIT,
Cambridge, MA, July 1981.
[19] R. F. Drenick and A. H. Levis, "A Mathematical Theory of Organization,
Part I: Centralized Organization," Polytechnic Institute of New York,
Brooklyn, NY, October, 1974.
t20] D. A. Stabile, "The Design of Information Structures; Basic Allocation
Strategies for Organizations," S.M. Thesis, MIT, Cambridge, MA, June 1981.
[21] R. G. Smith and R. Davis, "Frameworks for Cooperation in Distributed
Problem Solving," IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics,
Vol. SMC-11, pp. 61-70, January 1981.
32
